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ABSTRACT: Given his view that the modern world is ‘radically evil’, Adorno is an 
unlikely contributor to business ethics. Despite this, we argue that his work has a number 
of provocative implications for the field that warrant wider attention. Adorno regards our 
social world as damaged, unfree, and false and we draw on this critique to outline why the 
achievement of good work is so rare in contemporary society, focusing in particular on the 
ethical demands of roles and the ideological nature of management’s self-understanding. 
Nevertheless, we show that Adorno’s comments on activities such as art and philosophy 
mean that it is possible to draw on his work in a way that contributes constructively to the 
conversation about good and meaningful work within business ethics. 
 
The only philosophy which can be responsibly practiced in face of despair is the attempt to 
contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint of redemption... 
all else is reconstruction, mere technique. (Adorno, 2005a: 247) 
The modern social world is “radically evil” (Adorno, 1973a1: 243), a fundamentally 
“wrong life” that “cannot be lived rightly” (Adorno, 2005a2: 39). Such are the defining 
ethical claims of Theodor Adorno (1903-1969), the leading philosopher of the first 
generation of the Frankfurt School tradition (for engaging histories, see Jeffries, 2016; and 
Wiggerhaus, 1994).  Such claims are, of course, starkly at odds with the basic commitments 
that define the field of business ethics – a field which typically presupposes not only that 
contemporary society is not ‘radically evil’, but that it is perfectly possible to flourish, act 
rightly, and prosper within corporate modernity.  
It is no wonder, then, that while the later, more affirmative or reconstructive   
representatives of the Frankfurt School, such as Habermas (see Scherer & Palazzo, 2007; 
Goodman & Arenas, 2015; Scherer, 2015) and Honneth (see Islam, 2012; Visser, 2019), 
have had an impact in the business ethics literature, Adorno’s thought has so far received 
virtually no attention whatsoever.  
Nevertheless, we argue here that Adorno’s thought is – despite first impressions – rich with 
insights for business ethics. Of course, no credible interpretation of Adorno could 
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domesticate him as a friend of business. Indeed, in diagnosing our social world as radically 
evil, Adorno is indicting not just the contingent messy realities of our societies, but their 
basic institutional structure – including market civil society and the domain of business. 
And he maintains that the problems with our basic institutions are not such as could be 
overcome through incremental tweaks, legislative reforms, or well-meaning individuals 
doing their best. Rather, Adorno holds, our societies and their basic institutions are 
fundamentally and essentially bad. 
Despite this, Adorno’s ethical thought is by no means practically inert. Even though 
Adorno dismisses the modern social world’s claim to provide an adequate context in which 
human beings could flourish, he takes seriously our need for ethical orientation in this 
compromised world. Moreover, he holds that while our social world is radically 
compromised, there are nevertheless significant differentiations to be made, and 
meaningful, if profoundly circumscribed, choices available, within it. As such, while 
criticising the ethical inadequacies of our social world, his philosophy nevertheless offers 
guidance on how to live ‘less wrongly’, as Freyenhagen (2013) puts it, within that world. 
In this vein, we claim not that Adorno himself would have been willing to enter into the 
debates we address here, but only that his work has interesting and provocative 
implications for a variety of topics in the ethics of business, work, and commercial life, 
focusing in particular on our pursuit of good work. 
We begin by outlining Adorno’s ethical thought, setting out his distinctively thoroughgoing 
ethical criticism of the modern social world.  We then develop the implications of his 
overall analysis for the question of the barriers to our pursuit of good work: the way role 
identification shapes our orientation to work under contemporary capitalism, and in 
particular, the role of management and its self-understanding, which is divided between 
positivistic and humanistic conceptions. We then go on to address the question of good 
work directly, and to outline how Adorno’s thought can guide our reflections on the nature 
and possibility of the best kinds of work for human beings.  
Ultimately, while we may not persuade legions of converts to Adorno’s cause, we hope to 
show that Adorno’s critique of contemporary society promises to reward, and indeed 
demands, business ethicists’ serious attention – that, at the very least, it presents an 
instructive challenge worthy of their engagement. If our account is correct, it also offers 
something for Critical Theory scholars: insofar as our elaboration of Adorno’s position 
offers genuine illumination of issues in business ethics, it fleshes out and offers justificatory 
support to Adorno’s position. This suggests, in turn, that more sustained attention to 
business ethics will be fruitful for Critical Theory. 
 
ETHICS IN WRONG LIFE 
Adorno’s thought was decisively coloured by an unholy historical trinity: the Gulag, 
Hollywood, and, above all, Auschwitz. A socialist, Jewish, modernist intellectual – whose 
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hopes for the revolution were dashed in the East, who had fled the Nazi horror while close 
friends like Benjamin were not so fortunate, and whose experience as a refugee in 
American consumer capitalism was one of cultural trauma – Adorno’s thought was forged 
in the shadow of (as he saw it) the Enlightenment project’s disintegration (see Jager, 2003; 
Muller-Doohm, 2003).   
The dominant theme of Adorno’s thought thus became a melancholy protest against what 
he saw as the tragic privation of the modern social world. This social world is ‘damaged’ 
(Adorno, 2005a) in that it is a radically inhospitable place for human beings as such: it is 
antithetical to human flourishing and freedom. And this means modern society is 
inadequate in itself – it is a privative form of life. Adorno conceives of modern society as 
a “complex self-conditioning functional context” akin to a self-preserving system (Adorno, 
2017a3: 147), whose distinctive mechanism of self-preservation is the market system 
guided by the profit motive (Adorno, 20084: 9). The problem is that this system proceeds 
without regard to any values other than money value. The privilege of the profit motive 
means that the aim of maximizing money value is pursued, increasingly, at the expense of 
the very human interests the market was supposed to further.5 
The organising principle of this system is the “universal exchange relationship in which 
everything that exists, exists only for something else” (Adorno, 19936: 26, emphasis 
added). This system is premised on commodity exchange, which deals with everything as 
an exchangeable unit. It permits particular things and people to show up only insofar as 
they are functionally reduced to – treated as if they were – quantities of the abstract quality 
of value. This makes human beings and their needs “seem like mere things obeying the 
laws of the marketplace” (Zuidervaart, 1991: 76). Particulars are viewed exclusively from 
the perspective of what other actors will see them as equivalent to. Hence, “in the 
developed bourgeois society all life is dominated by the principle of exchange,” (Adorno, 
20067: 50) which, according to Adorno, constitutes the normative deep structure of modern 
societies. 
In this “exchange society” (Adorno, 1993: 28), everything and everyone is functionally 
reduced to a means to something else for which it can be exchanged. People are assimilated 
to the economic roles of buyer and seller, and these roles functionally reduce people to 
quantities: the individual appears as a consumer (a quantity of buying-power) and a worker 
(a quantity of labouring-power). To satisfy their basic needs, individuals are compelled to 
sell their labour. They have to make their life activity into a commodity, that is. an 
exchangeable unit. What labour as a commodity is exchangeable for is determined by what 
is profitable. But what happens to be profitable has no necessary connection with people’s 
needs, because consumptive wants have proved themselves to be so susceptible to 
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manipulation and manufacture (for illuminating discussions of manipulative advertising, 
see Aylsworth, 2020; Lippke, 1999).  
The exchange principle does not, however, remain within the economic sphere. The form 
of abstractive rationality underlying exchange, which treats every particular as an 
interchangeable unit and privileges systemic efficiency while suppressing real human 
interests, is equally evident in other social systems, such as the bureaucratic-administrative 
rationality that is increasingly subsuming social life. This underlying rationality is, 
according to Adorno, an outgrowth of a basic drive in the subject to master or dominate the 
object, “which finds its mental reflex in the principle of identity... the intrinsic aspiration 
of all mind to turn every alterity... into something like itself and in this way to draw it into 
its sphere.” (Adorno, 2008: 9, emphasis added) By assimilating objects – including persons 
– to abstract categories and dismissing any remainder, the subject enhances his or her power 
to classify, predict, manipulate, and control them.  
Most generally, such ‘identity thinking’ is the tendency to absolutize a formal principle, a 
concept, and treat particulars as merely bundles of the abstract qualities according to which 
they have been conceptualized. It is the thinking subject’s unconsciously motivated 
propensity to forget that “the concept is always less than what is subsumed under it.” 
(Adorno, 2008: 7) What gets overlooked is the “surplus of nonidentity” (Adorno, 1973a: 
183), the concrete specificity of the particular object that Adorno construes as the natural 
or material moment, which feels to the thinking subject “like an absolute threat.” (1973a: 
183) Such thinking suppresses the “preponderance of the object” in its natural, material 
particularly (Adorno, 1973a: 183; see O’Connor, 2004: ch.2), saying “what something 
comes under, what it exemplifies or represents, and what, accordingly, it is not itself.” 
(Adorno, 1973a: 149)  
Put into practice in societally actual rationality, the results are ethically disastrous, for the 
identitarian tendency to assimilate particulars to general categories suppresses the concrete 
significance and specific worth of particular persons, their needs and activities, flourishing 
and ailing. If other people show up only as exchangeable units of fungible matter within a 
conflict-based practical system, the temptation will be to ‘reify’ them (Adorno, 1973a: 190) 
– to treat them as insignificant things to be mastered, manipulated and controlled, without 
having to encounter them as concrete, uniquely significant particulars (see Jutten, 2010).  
This reification contributes to the sense in which modern society is ‘unfree’ (Adorno, 2006: 
202-3) in that it undermines and frustrates individual autonomy. At one level, it prevents 
individuals from exercising anything like self-governing control over their lives, 
subverting what liberal political philosophy calls personal autonomy (see Raz 1986). That 
is, it subverts one’s self-determination of one’s life’s course according to ends one sets for 
oneself. It does this, in particular, by forcing individuals to devote most of their time and 
energy to heteronomous rather than autonomous activities – modern work and the defences 
needed to tolerate it – and thereby draining people’s energy and suppressing their creative 
capacities for spontaneity and self-determination. 
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But the heteronomy – alien- rather than self-determination – runs deeper.  Adorno 
conceives the individual not as independently constituted but as mediated by the social 
whole: “What presents itself as an original entity, a monad, is only the result of a social 
division of a social process. Precisely as an absolute, the individual is a mere reflection of 
property relations” (Adorno, 2005a: 153). That is, the individual’s character is entwined 
with the character of the social world, through the adaptive processes of internalization and 
identification. Hence “freedom is really delimited by society, not only from outside but in 
itself...” (Adorno, 1973a: 297), so that “whether the subject is autonomous in reality… 
depends on objective reality” (Adorno, 2006: 222). And in actuality, Adorno claims, our 
damaged social world “prescribes his action to every individual, bar none” (1973a: 298), 
so that “in our universal state of dependency, there is no freedom” (Adorno, 2000: 176; see 
Reeves 2016a).  
By and large, people have adapted to the world so deeply, and are so defended against the 
conflict and sacrifice this has involved, that they have had to forgo developing the rational 
capacities required either to autonomously encounter one’s own psychic reality or to 
respond to social reality. Having internalized identity thinking, their experience of self and 
world is conditioned by distorting patterns of thought and action. We find ourselves 
vigilantly monitoring our every impulse under the watchful eye of the ‘omnipresent 
executive’ (Adorno, 2005a: 23), the imagined guardian of corporate expectations that so 
thoroughly governs our subjective experience. As a result of this distortion, our defences 
“absorb an immense quantity of available human strength” (Adorno, 1973a: 298), leaving 
little energy for autonomous, critical experience and practice.  
Individuals do of course sometimes feel free from society, but that feeling itself often 
manifests the societal principle of domination at work in the individual: “Even where men 
are most likely to feel free from society, in the strength of their ego, they are society’s 
agents at the same time. The ego principle is implanted in them by society.” (Adorno, 
1973a:  297) Even opposing the world can – where it takes the form of dogmatic self-
assertion – be heteronomous. 
Fundamentally, the inwardization of identity thinking generates heteronomy because it 
subverts the individual’s potential for rational health (see Harcourt 2018). In particular, 
the coldness to one’s own needs and suffering that it involves, along with the societal 
coldness towards others which it reinforces, undermines individuals’ capacities for 
autonomous, rational experience and action. This is in no small part why our wrong life 
cannot be lived rightly. 
That is, insofar as they have internalized identity thinking, individuals become trapped in 
a distorting pattern of thinking that prevents them from seeing or being guided by 
normatively relevant aspects of others and of themselves. And in that case, they can neither 
think nor act autonomously. Their coldness to their own and others’ needs and suffering is 
the decisive moment because, Adorno argues, suffering has a sui generis normative 
significance that is the ultimate ground of genuine, autonomous experience (see Geuss, 
2005; Baeza, 2015). It is reason’s non-defensive integration of the impulsive, somatic 
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“sense of solidarity with what Brecht called ‘tormentable bodies’” (Adorno, 1973a: 286) – 
both in oneself and in others – that would be required for autonomous experience. So long 
as individuals are defended against experiencing their own or others’ suffering as in-itself 
significant, the power for autonomous resistance to a cold world will remain unlikely. 
This is not to say that no freedom is available, however. Alongside his bleak diagnosis of 
the prevailing unfreedom of modern life, Adorno maintains that “despite all that, there is a 
genuine possibility of freedom.” (2006: 265) It may be impossible to live a genuinely 
autonomous life in our damaged social world, but the chance remains to develop, with luck 
and effort, enough strength to resist the badness of that world.  
However, even this possibility is limited by the fact that, as Adorno sees it, our societies 
are ‘false’ (2005a: 50) in that they necessarily present themselves falsely – that is, they 
functionally depend on ideology, on “socially necessary illusion.” (Adorno, 2006: 118) 
Such illusions are necessary for the social whole because they are needed to assist 
individuals in rationalising their adaptation to it.  
The essential implicit claim of such illusions is an extrapolation of identity thinking: that 
as things – society, people – are now is how they must be and ought to be (see Cook 2001); 
that the way things go is how they should go so that what exists is necessarily legitimate; 
that to challenge how things are is thus naive and impotent, while the realistic attitude is to 
accept and adapt to the world rather than complaining, and to go along with the prevailing 
identity principle and try to manipulate and control others. Such illusions deny that “what 
is [is] changeable.” (Adorno, 1973a: 398) While such illusions are appearances, they are 
appearances that are necessary. As Adorno puts it, “it lies in the nature of society to produce 
the contents of the minds of human beings, [and] to ensure that they are blind to the fact 
that they mistake what is mediated and determined for actuality or the property of their 
freedom, and treat them as absolutes.” (Adorno, 2008: 100) That is, such illusions are not 
arbitrarily manufactured ideas but the real semblance of damaged societies. Adorno 
devoted considerable energy to unpicking the ideological aspects of the major modern 
philosophical, sociological, and psychological theories. For in such works, he presses, the 
“formal categories are filled with a sedimented content that conceals the dominant [social] 
relations and the dominance of the universal.” (2006: 32)  
A central case of such identitarian ideology is positivism (Adorno, 19768). Originating in 
early modern empiricism, its core implicit commitments are, firstly, that the most basic 
level of reality consists of states and events and the constant conjunctions or universal 
regularities that hold between them, and, secondly, that knowledge consists in the 
observation of states and events and the systematic organization of those observations by 
the hierarchical arrangement of formal, if-then generalizations – laws – from which those 
observations are deducible (e.g. Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948; Popper, 2002). In reducing 
the world to the determinations of universal empirical regularity, positivism suppresses 
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both the specificity of particulars, and the significance of real but unactualized potential 
and so the possibility of genuine change. (Adorno, 1973a: 248, 269; see Reeves, 2009a) 
In the realm of human sciences, the aim is assumed to be the accumulation and organization 
of law-like statements covering the existing state of things, which can then be used to 
manipulate the human world in the manner of a ‘social engineer’ (see Neurath, 1973). Thus, 
positivistic ways of thinking tacitly invite and reinforce the assumption that the ways social 
and psychological reality are in the modern world are the only ways they could or ought to 
be, and are thus to be accepted rather than questioned. A human science  
which is committed to the ‘positive’ is in danger of losing all critical consciousness 
whatsoever. Then anything that diverges from the positive, that urges... questioning the 
legitimation of the social instead of merely ascertaining and classifying it, becomes open to 
suspicion... Only a critical spirit can make science more than a mere duplication of reality 
by means of thought. (Adorno, 1973b9: 11) 
This attitude tends to generate a de-historicized, reductive and “reified consciousness” of 
human phenomena. (Adorno, 2005c10: 38) Research informed by positivism is thus likely 
to be seriously deficient – tacitly affirming the damaged social world and concealing or 
diverting reflection on its systemic privations.  
As against positivism, however, an opposed form of theoretical ideology is prominent: 
idealism or humanism. Whereas positivism implies that what happens to be the case is all 
there is, idealism or humanism insists on something more beyond the positivistic picture, 
on an ethical surplus. Yet it does so in such a way that this ethical surplus is internally 
compromised by its being shackled negatively to the positivistic world to which it is 
opposed: by its being posited either as already available or as belonging to an extra-
empirical beyond, or both. We explore these ideologies with reference to management’s 
self-understanding in the following section. 
Such theoretical ideologies infiltrate ordinary consciousness primarily via ‘the culture 
industry’.11 But, Adorno insists, the culture industry is not perfectly efficient, and the 
societal integration of the individual is not total. Something survives in the individual that 
resists it: “It is doubtful that the culture industry and the consciousness of its consumers 
make an absolutely symmetric equation” (Adorno, 2005b: 174), because “the real interests 
of individuals are still strong enough to resist, up to a point, their total appropriation” 
(Adorno, 2005b: 175). This is not the least of the reasons why critical theoretical scrutiny 
of the damaged social world remains worthwhile. 
Adorno, then, offers an ethical critique of modern social life that has been overlooked in 
business ethics and yet is philosophically distinctive and, we suggest, rich in insight. Its 
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dominant normative register is that of badness rather than injustice, say, so that his social 
criticism is substantive rather than formal (see Freyenhagen, 2018). He is concerned not 
with unfairness but with what society does to and makes of people – the extent to which it 
suppresses individuals’ flourishing and freedom. And his critical ethics thus has a 
naturalistic Aristotelian conception of goodness and badness – flourishing and ailing – in 
play.  
Yet Adorno does not argue from a substantive account of flourishing, which he thinks 
remains unrealised and so unknowable. Adorno’s is a radical and negative Aristotelianism 
(Freyenhagen, 2013: ch.9; Reeves, 2016b). He proceeds by diagnosing and explaining 
concrete instances of socially rooted ailing and privation, which he claims are objective 
ones that are validated not against subjects’ self-understandings but by their conjunctive 
power to illuminate the phenomena of modern social experience. Indeed, Adorno claims 
that “the only thing that can perhaps be said is that the good life today would consist in 
resistance to forms of the bad life that have been seen through and critically dissected by 
the most progressive minds” (200012: 167-8). In line with this, we proceed by focusing on 
a critique of aspects of the ‘bad life’ which constitute barriers to our pursuit of good work, 
before going on to address the possibility of such good work within capitalist society.  
 
WORK IN WRONG LIFE I: ROLE-IDENTIFICATION 
Work is, for most people, “time that is determined heteronomously” (Adorno, 2005b: 167), 
determined, that is, according to an end and a form which are alien to the agent. In the 
employment relationship, one takes on a role, and as such is constrained to prioritise the 
ends set by one’s employer, for as long as one wishes to remain employed at least. In this 
way, the contemporary firm is often akin to an authoritarian state (Anderson, 2017). As 
Adorno puts it, there is a contradiction between “the definition which an individual knows 
as his own and his ‘role’, the definition forced upon him by society when he would make 
his living” (1973a: 152) - a contradiction, that is, between freedom and the necessity of 
getting by in a world hostile to one’s real human needs. 
Most are forced by market pressures to subordinate themselves to the alien direction of 
another, to rent themselves as economic mercenaries doing work that is entirely dissociated 
from their own ‘intentions’, and indeed even those intentions are liable to distortion by the 
process of their formation in market-society. Yet even those more fortunate in the labour 
market nevertheless remain on licence and always potentially hostage to the contingencies 
of market forces. In other words,  
no-one, without exception, can now determine his own life within even a moderately 
comprehensive framework, as was possible earlier in the assessment of market relationships. 
In principle everyone, however powerful, is an object. (Adorno, 2005a: 37) 
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Individuals’ propensity to identify with the social conditions of their lives suggests a more 
radical and primordial moment of psychic violence in which the individual’s inner needs 
are neutralised in advance.  That is, people are prone to adaptively internalizing the 
principle of a harsh world so deeply that their suppressed needs no longer register. The 
needs themselves do not persist; they are distorted into the “wrong form”, (Adorno, 1973a: 
92) into “false” or “inverted needs” pre-emptively deformed so that they are compatible 
with an inhospitable world (Adorno, 1973a: 93; see Nevasto 2019). This, Adorno claims, 
helps explain why people so readily identify with heteronomous conditions rather than 
reacting to and resisting those conditions. And in adapting themselves to an inhospitable 
social world, they prevent themselves from being what they really are themselves, from 
encountering their real needs and interests. 
This observation suggests an affinity between Adorno’s position and more recent work on 
adaptive preferences. The concept of adaptive preferences has its origins in Elster’s (1983) 
comments on unconscious preference formation but is more often associated with 
Nussbaum’s (2001) normative application. Adaptive preferences, in the latter sense, are 
unconsciously motivated preferences for things which are not good for us, and which we 
should not prefer, other things being equal, such as being discriminated against or 
disrespected. As Satz notes, “markets themselves can help shape our preferences [and thus] 
they may not reflect what is really important for us” (Satz, 2010: 69). The difference is that 
for Adorno the scope of such adaptive preferences is wide, sometimes all-encompassing, 
and market-shaped preferences are often directly contrary to our real needs. 
The phenomenon of role-identification is a telling example of this, and marks a servile 
subordination to the ‘realities of work’. Adorno notes that 
the growing concentration of the economy, the executive and the bureaucracy has advanced 
to such an extent that people are reduced more and more to the status of functions. What 
freedom remains is superficial, part of the cherished private life, and lacks substance as far 
as people’s ability to determine their own lives is concerned. (Adorno, 2006: 5) 
On this view, while the ‘cherished private life’ is conceptually distinguishable from the self 
that reflects one’s work role, it is already subordinate to it. The private self is mutilated and 
already defined by its limited freedom and its inability to meaningfully determine its life, 
a determination that would require some control over one’s daily activities, including those 
of the workplace.  
The pressure toward identifying with the social world makes individuals prone to 
internalize their objectively imposed roles and to see themselves under alien concepts that 
are antagonistic to their real needs and potential for freedom. Hence, even in their private 
existence, freedom is suppressed – so much so that any straight-forward distinction 
“between human beings as they are in themselves and their so-called social roles” has 
become impossible (Adorno, 2005b: 167), for those 
roles extend deep into the characteristics of people themselves, into their innermost 
composition. In the age of truly unprecedented social integration it is difficult to discern 
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anything at all in people that might be other than functionally determined. (Adorno, 2005b: 
167-8) 
To cope with the demand to take up alien economic roles, individuals – Adorno suggests – 
internalise those roles, which sediment into alien identities.  
Now if Adorno is right, we would not expect phenomenological research into subjective 
experiences of work to be a reliable guide to the ethical problems of role-identification. 
Indeed, it is striking how often employees, even in the face of increased precarity and work 
intensity, retain ‘personal attachments’ to their employers and occupations (Musílek, Jamie, 
& McKie, 2020) even as the damage done by social reality renders them cold to their own 
needs.  
This ostensibly puzzling attachment to one’s employers manifests itself in the subjective 
enjoyment of forms of work that are transparently bad. Hughes (1951: 319) suggested that 
‘dirty work’ carries a stigma or taint and, as a result, those who perform such jobs are also 
stigmatised. However, people who do such jobs are often quite satisfied by their work, with 
cleaners seeming to be particularly happy (see Léné, 2019). A partial explanation may be 
that such work involves relatively loose monitoring or an enhanced degree of camaraderie 
(see Deery, Kolar, & Walsh, 2019), but this seems unlikely to be the whole story. Adorno’s 
account would suggest a further explanation in terms of psychological self-preservation. It 
is not that the subjective experience of such work is directly a phenomenon to be 
welcomed; rather, it is that, shorn of any sense of power to change the situation, the only 
way for such persons to avoid despair is to reframe their situation as ‘not all that bad’, or 
‘quite pleasant really’. 
On top of the inherent inadequacy of their work, workers who identify with inherently 
inadequate work flourish less, because in order to identify with their role, they must 
inevitably repress, split off, or dissociate their very dissatisfaction with their predicament. 
That is, they not only confront an external antagonism to their well-being, but they 
internalise that antagonism, identifying with it and taking it inside.  Since they are unable 
to adjust the world to their own needs, they adapt their own needs to the world, disavowing 
their own dissatisfaction with their experience. Now they do not merely tolerate 
unsatisfying work, they embrace it. According to Adorno, the psychic costs of such 
identification are the disowning of one’s apprehension of one’s needs and suffering such 
that one’s reflective self-awareness is aligned with the constraints of the identified-with 
role(s). Such role-identification amongst workers might, then, seem to be a prime example 
of the inwardization of identity thinking and its consequences. 
Yet, far from being seen as a problem, there are currents in the literature that endorse 
conceiving of business ethics as a matter of teasing out the ethically salient nuances of the 
business role, and treating wider personal and ethical commitments as being quite 
irrelevant. Sternberg restricts business ethics to the ethical choices we face in our “business 
capacity” (2000: 252). Marcoux suggests that business ethics should be restricted to an 
examination of the “moral contours of business practice” (2009: 26). Heath’s (2014) 
influential market failures approach to business ethics emphasises the function of the 
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market and conceives of business ethics as a set of deontic constraints designed to uphold 
regulation and behaviour that are conducive to this function. Adorno’s position presents a 
distinctive challenge to such accounts in pressing the freedom-undermining effect of the 
social pressure to adapt to and identify with employment roles.  
His point is not merely that someone’s freedom is constrained by the range of actually 
available roles. The individual is also pressed to internalize his or her transient and tentative 
relations to those roles, so that such transience and tentativeness becomes the very form of 
the person’s relation to his or her identities. In this light it is perhaps no mere coincidence 
that sociology regularly refers to persons as social actors; the structure of economic roles 
demands of everyone that he or she live like an actor ready to take up any given role in 
order to make ends meet. The social demand to make oneself available to fill any role – to 
be an actor – pushes individual freedom back into the private sphere; one’s freedom as a 
person is whittled down to the limited discretion one exercises over which economic roles 
one takes up and the hemmed-in freedom one exercises in one’s private life. The 
fragmented role of the actor is perhaps becoming the social role par excellence, and given 
the increasing scope for monitoring and measurement available today, it seems that now 
there is rarely an opportunity for ‘off-stage’ repose. 
Indeed, various digital transformations in the workplace in recent decades have “become 
entangled with societal developments, such as new forms of capitalism, new modes of 
production, the editing of social realities, and emergent forms of governance” (Flyverbom, 
Deibert, & Matten, 2019: 8), which has opened up even greater possibilities for domination 
by roles. In a less wrong life, the “liberated ego, no longer locked up in its identity, would 
no longer be condemned to play roles either… society would lose the horror of shaping the 
individuals throughout” (Adorno, 1973a: 278-9) – but this must seem like a rather remote 
possibility today.  
This sense of subordination to one’s work role, or to one’s actor role in juggling various 
roles, or a general tendency for loyalty to one’s employer to be treated as meritorious (for 
discussions of this concept in the context of business ethics, see Melé, 2001; Varelius, 
2009), has broader ethical implications for the self and the kinds of relationships available 
to us under capitalism. Adorno writes that  
the private lives of countless people are becoming those of agents and go-betweens; indeed 
the entire private domain is being engulfed by a mysterious activity that bears all the features 
of commercial life without there being actually any business to transact... [Such people act 
so as to] ingratiate themselves with the executive they imagine omnipresent, and soon there 
is no relationship that is not seen as a ‘connection’, no impulse not first censored as to 
whether it deviates from the acceptable. (2005a: 23) 
The upshot is that, whereas it was once considered “uncouth” to pursue practical aims in 
one’s personal life, now “it is seen as arrogant, alien, and improper to engage in private 
activity without any evident ulterior motive. Not to be ‘after’ something is almost suspect” 
(2005a: 23-24). Adorno’s words here are prescient.  
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WORK IN WRONG LIFE II: MANAGEMENT AND ITS SELF-UNDERSTANDING 
Such identification with bad work, internalization of personal subordination to one’s work 
roles and to one’s actor role, is promoted by certain managerial practices which deliberately 
encourage employees’ attachment, and indeed personal subordination, to commercial life. 
Precarious contracts and various forms of employee monitoring have become normalised 
(Rubery, Grimshaw, Keizer, & Johnson, 2018), and recruitment practices such as ‘social 
media screening’ of job candidates threatens to further cement the tendency to see every 
relationship as a contact, and every facet of one’s personal life as a means to a ‘practical’, 
that is, economic, end. 
Social media screening of applicants is a particularly illuminating example. It is becoming 
more widespread (Cunningham, 2013; Jeske & Shultz, 2016) and is employed with the aim 
of gathering further information about candidates (Slovensky & Ross, 2012), despite the 
fact that there is evidence that it is ineffective (Van Iddekinge, Lanivich, Roth, & Junco, 
2016). Tellingly, “many hiring professionals consider which groups [candidates] belong to 
and what others post to their profiles to be important reflections of a candidate.” (Root & 
McKay, 2014: 205) The corresponding need to maintain an ‘on brand’ social media 
presence suggests that Adorno’s metaphorical ‘omnipresent executive’ is acquiring a literal 
actuality that Adorno could not have foreseen, fuelling a felt need for hypervigilance 
regarding one’s social interactions that is deeply antithetical to human flourishing and 
freedom. 
Another powerful barrier to the possibility of good work is managerial ideology. 
Management is an archetypal embodiment of the identitarian reason that, with its urge to 
classify and categorise human beings so that their behaviour might be predicted and 
controlled, Adorno locates as the dark side of Enlightenment. A significant strain in 
management research endorses a scientistic and technicist conception of management as 
essentially an art of classifying, appraising, and manipulating persons. As Freeman and 
Newkirk put it: “Implicit in much of the management discussion is a mechanical, 
deterministic, positivistic view of business—a financial engine controlled by the 
machinery of scientific management.” (2009: 117)  
Adorno’s critique of positivism is readily applicable to this position. As we saw, according 
to Adorno positivism obscures the distinction between what is and what ought to be (Cook, 
2001), a distinction that is largely missing from such research.13 It implicitly accepts the 
existing state of things and aspires to accumulate predictive knowledge of human beings 
so as to be able to manipulate and control them in the sense in which the natural sciences 
use knowledge of fixed tendencies and propensities to manipulate the natural world.  
                                                     
13  For this reason, Adorno’s work has found some application in the field of critical management studies 
(examples include Parker, 2003; Klikauer, 2015). Convincing critiques of positivism abound (see Keat, 
1981: ch.1; Sayer, 1992; Benton, 1977; Outhwaite, 1987: ch.1), and Adorno’s work has been a decisive 
mainspring of this literature. 
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The Adornian position here has strong affinities with Alasdair MacIntyre’s well-known 
critique of management as being inherently manipulative and dependent on an illusory 
conception of managerial expertise (MacIntyre, 2007: ch.3; see Sinnicks, 2018). However, 
there is a rival conception of management that Adorno’s ethics is also well-placed to 
critique. Whereas the technicist model of management is relatively unconcerned by the 
moral contours of the managerial role – on such a view, the manager is an expert who is 
relatively divorced from ‘softer’ questions of values – the humanistic understanding of 
management begins with the question: “[g]iven the role of the manager, what are the 
obligations and responsibilities that accompany that role?” (Bowie & Werhane, 2004: 1) 
Within business ethics this humanistic understanding of management is more widely 
accepted than is the positivistic or technicist understanding. As a result, much work in 
business ethics is concerned with such topics as the distinctive social and ethical 
responsibilities of management (Carroll, 2000; von Kriegstein, 2016), whether 
management is a profession (Donaldson, 2000), whether management is an intrinsically 
good and morally educative practice (Moore, 2008), which virtues the managerial role 
requires (Audi, 2012), whether management requires phronesis (Tsoukas, 2019), and so 
on.  
However, by Adornian lights, well-meaning attempts to humanise management are, like 
the positivist-technicist accounts they oppose, ‘false’, an example of ideology, of socially 
necessary illusion. This is because they posit an ethical surplus which points beyond how 
things happen to be as already existing and thus as implicitly vindicating an evil social 
world, while blinding themselves to the truth of the positivistic picture, namely, that others 
are widely treated as mere tools to be mastered, manipulated, and controlled. Indeed, even 
research into ethical management adopts a presupposition of managerial superiority and 
underplays the capacities of ordinary employees (Munro & Thanem, 2018). 
On this view, attempts to cast management in humanistic terms are themselves acts of self-
preservation. It is difficult, if not impossible, for people to understand themselves as 
devoting so much of their time and energy merely to performing tasks required of them by 
capitalist society, and thus it may be better to understand managerial ethics as a form of 
what Sykes and Matza (1957) called ‘techniques of neutralization’. Whereas 
rationalisations are used after the fact to insulate people from blame or self-approbation, 
techniques of neutralization can occur in advance of any questionable behaviour as a means 
of lessening the ostensible tension between that behaviour and other, countervailing 
expectations, values, or commitments. This can perhaps help us to explain the frustratingly 
cyclical nature of business ethics, noted by Abend (2013, 2014), where periods of recurrent 
scandal are followed by periods in which all involved earnestly resolve never to let such 
failings occur again, before they inevitably do, and commentators are left puzzling over the 
frequently observed “gap between what businesses should be doing and what they actually 
do” (Brenkert, 2019: 918). In this way managers are victims of the general problem of role-




Most occupations presently available are artefacts of the capitalist system and thus are 
analogous to the entertainment products that are the outputs of the culture industry. A 
genuine work of art is very different to an entertainment product. This is because the latter 
has been designed to maximise the income of its producer. As such, the final product 
inevitably bears the mark of such calculative origins. While the telos of art generates a 
tendency towards original and challenging works, culture industry products will tend, in 
the long run, toward repetition of profitable formulae and gratification of the audience. 
Likewise, a genuinely ethically autonomous occupation is very different from those 
occupations our exchange society makes available, in that the latter have been crafted to, 
or perhaps evolved to, generate profit. Despite its exaggeration, Adorno’s remark that 
“every visit to the cinema leaves me, against all my vigilance, stupider and worse” (2005a: 
25), has – as a resistance to the manipulativeness and vacuity of commercial films – a ring 
of truth about it. Good films are accidental to the machinery of big studio film production 
and occur only when there happens to be a coincidence of artistic worth and the broader 
institutional goals of selling tickets and merchandise. Just as the Hollywood film has not 
been developed with artistic value in mind, management has not been developed to provide 
meaningful, humane, virtuous roles and activities; rather, both have been developed for and 
conditioned by one guiding purpose only: maximising the return on capital investment. 
However, there is an unresolved possibility here: we have conceded that some films are 
good, but if this is so then our analogy would seem, against the general tenor of Adorno’s 
account of modernity, to allow for good occupations. It is to this possibility that we turn in 
the following section. 
 
THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD WORK 
So far we have been concerned with positioning Adorno in the “underexplored role of… 
business ethicist as an internal social critic” (Wicks, Werhane, Elms, & Nolan, 2020: 9). 
However, in this section we adopt a more constructive task: exploring the possibility of 
good work even within a social world much deserving of criticism. The ethical quality of 
work is usually couched in terms of meaningful work, and contributions in this subfield 
have focused on topics such as virtue and meaningful work (Beadle & Knight, 2012), 
meaningful work as a human need (Yeoman, 2014), and meaningful work and human 
dignity (Sison, Ferrero, & Guitián, 2016), amongst others.  
Adorno would be suspicious of the optimistic tone of much of this literature, and his 
remarks in praise of the ideal of “freedom from work” (Adorno & Horkheimer, 201914: 16) 
might suggest he inclines towards the anti-work tradition (e.g. Gorz, 1985; Fleming, 2015).  
Indeed, his privileging of the idea of “eternal peace” (Adorno, 2005a: 157), the notion that 
“the true society will grow tired of development and, out of freedom, leave possibilities 
unused,” as against the “wishful image of an uninhibited, vital, creative man... the 
conception of unfettered activity, activity of uninterrupted procreation, of chubby 
                                                     
14 A record of conversations which took place in 1956. 
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insatiability, of freedom as frantic bustle,” (Adorno, 2005a: 156) lend support to this view. 
However, Adorno’s claim that “free time is shackled to its contrary,” (Adorno, 2005b: 167) 
as well as his disparaging remarks on hobbies (see Adorno, 2005b: 168, 170), implies that 
good work – work that is autonomous and meaningful – rather than the more passive 
concept of ‘free time’, is central to any attempt to live ‘less wrongly’.15 
To be sure, modern work is, for Adorno, generally neither free nor meaningful. It is 
typically directed to an alien end in that it is directed to a purpose that is not one’s own. It 
involves the necessary “subordination of one’s activity to the arbitrary will of others” 
(Hegel, 1991: s.197, emphasis added). And the form of work in exchange society is 
systematically alien to the individual as well. The character of work, as well as the purpose 
to which it is put, is determined by profitability and thus efficiency, and this drives the 
increasing division of labour to separate and specialise functions within the production 
process so as to whittle away both any sense of purposeful activity toward even an alien 
end, and any place for the skilful or artful deployment of creative capacities. As Hegel 
observed, “the specialization and limitation of particular work... leads to an inability to feel 
and enjoy the wider freedoms, and particularly the spiritual advantages, of civil society.” 
(Hegel, 1991: s.243, original emphasis) 
Hegel’s remarks here might call to mind Dawkins’s (2019) distinction between voluntary 
employment and coerced servitude. However, as we noted earlier, Adorno’s conception of 
heteronomy is wider, offering grounds to resist equating voluntariness with genuine 
autonomy. On his view, the autonomy/heteronomy distinction cannot be reducible to the 
voluntary/coerced distinction, because the latter is derivative of the former. Any plausible 
account of what distinguishes a voluntary agreement from a coerced one will have to appeal 
to a theory of autonomy and heteronomy. That is to say, whether any particular sort of 
agreement is coerced or consensual must depend not on whether the end comes from within 
the agent or from an external source but on the quality of the relationship between the 
‘externally’ offered motive and the person’s nature as an agent. 
Autonomy is, for Adorno, an objective, not merely a subjective, quality of a person’s 
relation to his or her activity. It pertains not merely to how the person experiences his or 
her relation to his or her activity (whether the person voluntarily agrees to or resists it, say), 
but to the objective quality of that relation, about which the person may be mistaken. As 
the problems of role-identification imply, a person’s endorsing a first-order or higher-order 
end may be no more than an unconscious rationalisation of the fact that they have no 
alternative to adopting it. It is not, though, that taking up another’s end is necessarily alien 
that makes modern work heteronomous – taking up another’s end can be a supremely 
autonomous act, as in the endeavours of care involved in parenthood and loving devotion 
                                                     
15 There is some affinity here with Arendt’s (1958) distinction between work, labour, and action insofar as 
both Adorno and Arendt see tedious, heteronomous work as being central to contemporary society and 
meaningful, autonomous action as being most worthy of our aspirations. See Reeves (2009b) for a 
discussion of Adorno’s relationship to Arendt. 
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to others generally. It is, rather, that the market economy blocks the autonomous taking up 
of another’s end as one's own end that makes it heteronomous.  
Because of the pervasiveness, as Adorno sees it, of heteronomous ends within employment, 
the ends pursued in the workplace tend to be divorced from matters of abiding concern and 
interest to employees, and work tends toward oppressive drudgery. One of the most 
essential symptoms of the heteronomy of modern work is thus, Adorno suggests, boredom: 
Boredom is a function of life under the compulsion to work and under the rigorous division 
of labour. Boredom need not necessarily exist... Boredom is the reflex reaction to objective 
dullness... [it] is objective desperation. (2005b: 171) 
Here Adorno presents boredom as a mode of suffering, the mode most objectively 
appropriate to the experience of modern work. 
However, there is greater scope to tease out an understanding of good work from Adorno’s 
writings than it might seem. That work is a central determinant of our well-being (as the 
contemporary business ethics literature would have it) or of our ailing (as Adorno would 
see it) has been a feature of critical social thought since at least Marx’s Economic and 
Philosophic Manuscripts (Marx, 1978; see also, for discussions of Marx in the business 
ethics literature, Shaw, 2009; Sinnicks, 2020). Indeed, Aristotle’s sharp distinction between 
praxis and poesis shows that the recognition that human flourishing is enabled or 
constrained by the activities which shape our lives has been a feature of Western philosophy 
throughout its history, though perhaps one that has come into and gone out of focus at 
different times. While Adorno is less willing to make positive claims about human needs 
and the conditions of flourishing than either Marx or Aristotle, his observations of the 
suffering that bad work creates – in particular, boredom construed as an appropriate 
reaction to objective dullness – negatively suggests that he recognises a real human need, 
suppressed in modern work, for “activities [which] are reasonable and meaningful in 
themselves” (Adorno, 2005b: 171). 
Indeed, while Adorno’s pessimism about social life is a prominent feature of his thought, 
this should not blind us to the fact that this is “coupled with a strong optimism about human 
potential” (Freyenhagen, 2013: 1). As Adorno puts it, “without exception, men have yet to 
become themselves. By the concept of the self we should properly mean their potential, 
and this potential stands in polemical opposition to the [current] reality of the self.” (1973a: 
278) It is this optimism that grounds Adorno’s negative evaluation of modern social life: it 
is inadequate and unbefitting of humanity, given what we really are and could in actuality 
become. Without this latent optimism, the pessimistic remarks about our culture, and the 
overwhelmingly negative evaluations of the wide array of phenomena Adorno discusses, 
would scarcely be intelligible. 
While most work under capitalism is bound to reflect the various pathologies, to greater or 
lesser degrees, that we have described, there are nevertheless forms of activity which are, 
again to greater or lesser degrees, distinct from the mundane and alienated realities of work 
under capitalism. Such activities are marked not only by the individual’s opportunity to 
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“seek out and arrange his work according to his own intentions” (Adorno, 2005b: 169) but 
by the objectively meaningful nature of the activities themselves. After all, many who do 
have the opportunity to choose their own work opt to continue in work that is characterised 
by the alienation and reification of the exchange principle (think of stereotypical media 
moguls, workaholic CEOs or corporate tycoons).  
Forms of genuine activity are marked by their relative freedom from the reifying forces of 
exchange society, whereby they approximate kinds of genuine experience that comes close 
to fulfilling genuine needs for creative activity and granting genuinely autonomous 
experience, even if the wider context ensures that they will fall some way short of this telos. 
The best exemplars of such work, for Adorno, are pursuits such as rational enquiry, 
epitomised by philosophy when in good order, and artistic creation, so these are the most 
apt focus for an Adornian account of good work. 
To be sure, Adorno’s appraisal of what has historically become of the practice of 
philosophy is characteristically negative and mournful. The philosophical tradition has, 
under the social pressures of the identitarian reification of thinking, largely collapsed into 
resignation and abdication of its proper telos: in particular, under the “general tendency 
toward specialization, philosophy too has established itself as a specialized discipline, one 
purified of all specific content.” (Adorno, 2005d16: 6). And because “the domain of every 
kind of knowledge has been confiscated by the specialized disciplines... philosophical 
thought feels terrorized and fears being refuted as dilettantism whenever it takes on specific 
content.” (Adorno, 2005d: 7) The consequence is that “the philosophical tradition... today 
lies in ruins.” (2005d: 7) In particular, in both the two main movements of Adorno’s time 
– positivism and Heideggerian fundamental ontology – “thinking becomes a necessary evil 
and is broadly discredited.” (Adorno, 2005d: 9) 
Yet the problem with these movements is their abdication of the proper philosophical task, 
which remains valid: “Thinking loses its element of independence. The autonomy of reason 
vanishes” (Adorno, 2005d: 9, emphasis added). So this diagnosis of the disintegration of 
the philosophical enterprise itself testifies to the context-transcendent vitality of the real 
telos of philosophy that in principle raises it above reification: “philosophy has denied its 
own constitutive concept: intellectual freedom that does not obey the dictates of specialized 
knowledge” (Adorno, 2005d: 6) – but in that case philosophy in principle exemplifies just 
this intellectual freedom that raises it above bad work. And insofar as philosophical activity 
takes seriously the need to critically resist the evil of the social world, it remains possible: 
Philosophy that satisfies its own intention, that does not childishly skip behind its own 
history and the real one, has its lifeblood in the resistance against the common practices of 
today and what they serve, against the justification of what happens to be the case (Adorno, 
2005d: 6). 
That is, philosophy is in principle, in its own concept, an activity that is oriented to genuine, 
non-reified and non-instrumental experience. 
                                                     
16 In Critical Models, originally published 1969. 
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Similarly, despite its contamination by exchange society and subsumption by the culture 
industry, when practiced genuinely art can, thinks Adorno, “offer both utopian vision and 
social critique” (Zuidervaart, 2007: 10). Indeed, for Adorno, “both rational inquiry and art, 
accomplished properly, share features from each other” (Hulatt, 2016: xii). Genuine 
artworks, for Adorno, have the ethical potential to lift us out of the stupefying context of 
exchange relations by embodying a non-defensive reconciliation of reason and nature. As 
he writes regarding Beethoven, “it is only in experiencing its own naturalness that genius 
soars above nature” (Adorno, 1973a: 397). 
Thus, philosophical and artistic activity are something like paradigms of good work – that 
is, work befitting our human potential. Insofar as our lives are shaped by such activities, 
and activities that approximate them, this enables us to live less wrongly. It is not that full 
flourishing, in the Aristotelian sense, is available to us in capitalist society so long as we 
are artists or philosophers. Neither art nor philosophy can entirely transcend the damaged, 
unfree, and false conditions in which it exists. It is rather that such activities contain a germ 
of humanity that is inherently resistant to the modern order and the identity thinking which 
characterises it. 
Creative activities like art and philosophy are relatively – though clearly not absolutely – 
immune to the relentless pressure to be productive and useful at all times, even where the 
ends to which such production and utility are devoted remain beyond our grasp. In a rare 
moment of candour about his vision of a better society, Adorno claims that 
satisfied need will make it possible to relate to the world without knocking it into shape 
through universal usefulness. If classless society promises the end of art by sublating the 
tension between the actual and the possible, then at the same time it also promises the 
beginning of art, the useless, whose intuition tends towards reconciliation with nature 
because it is no longer in the service of usefulness to the exploiters. (Adorno, 2017b17: 104) 
The best art produced in the wrong life allows us, however inadequately, to apprehend the 
possibilities beyond it and, in a better life, would, perhaps, allow us to move beyond 
instrumental reason altogether. What we may regard as good work thus does not directly 
contribute to a ‘well lived life’, as that possibility is not open to us, according to Adorno. 
Rather it gives us grounds for thinking that such a life is not impossible entirely. It is 
individuals’ needs for enriching and extending forms of activity that are decisive, and 
exchange society – which sees every person’s labour as no more than a quantity of a 
fungible stuff – is constitutionally incapable of satisfying them. Creative work of various 
kinds, by contrast, is in tension with this tendency. Something approximating such 
autonomous, creative activity is not entirely absent in our social world, but that it is a luxury 
available to a few rather than something every person is entitled to enjoy is one of the 
fundamental travesties of wrong life. 
                                                     
17 Originally presented as a seminar in 1942. The original translation retains several German terms in 
brackets, which we have removed for the sake of readability. 
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This may provide some comfort to artists and scholars, but what of the more prosaic forms 
of work that make up the overwhelming majority of jobs in our society? Some kinds of 
work in the contemporary business world are, by these lights, so essentially corrupt that 
they cannot even be made less bad in any meaningful sense, while others are less radically 
compromised and can be ameliorated. The key point, however, is that whether or not a kind 
of work can be ameliorated, to the extent that it can, any ameliorative changes will be in 
conflict with the fundamental identitarian logic of capitalist society. Such attempts at 
amelioration will thus be against the grain of the fundamental tendency that exerts its 
pressure on all aspects of work today.  
Nevertheless, sometimes amelioration is, surely, possible. There are bound to be exceptions 
to the general tendency, but, like the example of good Hollywood films noted earlier, they 
will be felicitous coincidences. Occasionally, an ameliorative change may happen to be 
compatible with the drive to maximise profit, but only contingently. Thus, any kind of 
widespread, significant, and lasting improvement to the world of work would require a 
transformation of our ‘wrong life’. This is because the identitarian logic of exchange that 
governs economic life in capitalist society, expressed in the overriding importance of the 
profit motive, makes exchange-value the sole and overriding end of economic activity. 
Other ends – such as free and meaningful human activity – can show up as ends only when 
and insofar as they contingently align with the profit motive, which is to say that they never 
really get to show up as ends at all. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We hope to have shown that Adorno’s work is, perhaps surprisingly, well placed to 
contribute to the conversation on the ethical quality of work within the field of business 
ethics. This is not because Adorno’s work can guide us with regard to the quandaries that 
emerge from engaging in the moral contours of business life but because Adorno’s social 
criticism operates at the level of the social whole. His ethical critique of our social world 
engages the multitude of factors – metaphysical, economic, psychological, sociological, 
political, and so on – that shape the realities of work and commercial life and provide the 
background conditions for any intelligible business ethics, challenging the framing 
assumptions of many positions and disputes in the discipline. Adorno’s critique appraises 
modern work from the unrestricted standpoint of the potential for human flourishing, 
eviscerating the suppression of that potential in our social world. And his concretely 
utopian suggestions on the possibility of good work proceed negatively, through the 
suffering and frustration wrought by work in our existing social world, to the articulation 
of forms of genuine, meaningful and liberated human activity possessed of transcendent 
worth.  
Now, insofar as we have been able to show that Adorno’s analyses illuminate particular 
phenomena and problems related to modern work, we will also have provided further 
support for the overall justification of Adorno’s ethics, for the justification of his position 
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is ultimately dependent on its capacity to illuminate the concrete phenomena. So, while 
business ethics can learn from Adorno’s insights, that this is the case in turn corroborates 
the explanatory and elucidatory power of Adorno’s Critical Theory.  
While it has its own ideological blind spots and biases, like any academic discipline, in 
light of the Adornian interventions we have outlined, it may be – again, surprisingly – that 
business ethics has an advantage over more detached forms of ethical theorising in virtue 
of its potential to capture what is wrong with our current form of ethical life. Its problems 
are more clearly related to the ethical experience of most people – work and employment, 
the market society, management, and other such topics covered by the field of business 
ethics, are central to all of our lives for good or, as is more likely, ill. This suggests that 
contrary to first impressions, Adorno’s contributions to business ethics are illuminating not 




Abend, G. 2013. The origins of business ethics in American universities, 1902–1936. 
Business Ethics Quarterly, 23(2): 171–205. 
Abend, G. 2014. The moral background: An inquiry into the history of business ethics. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Adorno, T. W. 1973a. Negative dialectics. New York: Continuum. 
Adorno, T. W. 1973b. The concept of sociology. In Frankfurt Institute for Social Research 
(Ed.), Aspects of sociology: 1-15 London: Heinemann. 
Adorno, T. W. 1976. Introduction. In T. W. Adorno, H. Albert, R. Dahrendorf, J. Habermas, 
H. Pilot, & K. Popper (Eds.), The positivist dispute in German sociology: 1-67. London: 
Heinemann. 
Adorno, T. W. 1993. Hegel: Three studies. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Adorno, T. W. 2000. Problems of moral philosophy. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Adorno, T. W. 2005a. Minima moralia: Reflections on a damaged life. London: Verso 
Books. 
Adorno, T. W. 2005b. Free time. In H Pickford (Trans.), Critical models: 167-76. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Adorno, T. W. 2005c. Note on human science and culture. In H. Pickford (Trans.), Critical 
models: 37-40. New York: Columbia University Press. 
                                                     
18 We would like to thank handling editor, Prof. Lindsay Thompson, as well as two anonymous reviewers 
for BEQ for comments on previous versions of this article. 
21 
 
Adorno, T. W. 2005d. Why still philosophy. In H. Pickford (Trans.), Critical models: 5-18. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
Adorno, T. W. 2006. History and freedom: Lectures 1964–1965. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Adorno, T. W. 2008. Lectures on negative dialectics. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Adorno, T. W. 2017a. An introduction to dialectics. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Adorno, T. W. 2017b. Theses on need (M. Shuster & I. Macdonald, Trans.). Adorno Studies, 
1(1): 101–4. 
Adorno, T. W., & Horkheimer, M. 2019. Towards a new manifesto. London: Verso Books. 
Anderson, E. 2017. Private government: How employers rule our lives (and why we don’t 
talk about it). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Arendt, H. 1958. The human condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Audi, R. 2012. Virtue ethics as a resource in business. Business Ethics Quarterly, 22(2): 
273–91. 
Aylsworth, T. 2020. Autonomy and manipulation: Refining the argument against 
persuasive advertising. Journal of Business Ethics. DOI:10.1007/s10551-020-04590-6. 
Baeza, N. 2015. The normative role of negative affect and bodily experience in Adorno. 
Constellations, 22(3): 354–68. 
Beadle, R., & Knight, K. 2012. Virtue and meaningful work. Business Ethics Quarterly, 
22(2): 433–50. 
Benton, T. 1977. Philosophical foundations of the three sociologies. London: Routledge. 
Bowie, N. E., & Werhane, P. H. 2004. Management ethics. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Brenkert, G. G. 2019. Mind the gap! The challenges and limits of (global) business ethics. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 155(4): 917–30. 
Carroll, A. B. 2000. Ethical challenges for business in the new millennium: Corporate 
social responsibility and models of management morality. Business Ethics Quarterly, 
10(1): 33–42. 
Cook, D. 2001. Adorno, ideology and ideology critique. Philosophy and Social Criticism, 
27(1): 1–20. 
Cunningham, C. (Ed.). 2013. Social networking and impression management: Self-
presentation in the digital age. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Dawkins, C. E. 2019. A normative argument for independent voice and labor unions. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 155(4): 1153–65. 
22 
 
Deery, S., Kolar, D., & Walsh, J. 2019. Can dirty work be satisfying? A mixed method 
study of workers doing dirty jobs. Work, Employment, and Society, 33(4): 631–47. 
Donaldson, T. 2000. Are business managers “professionals”? Business Ethics Quarterly, 
10(1): 83–94. 
Elster, J. 1983. Sour grapes: Studies in the subversion of rationality. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Fleming, P. 2015. The mythology of work: How capitalism persists despite itself. London: 
Pluto Press. 
Flyverbom, M., Deibert, R., & Matten, D. 2019. The governance of digital technology, big 
data, and the internet: New roles and responsibilities for business. Business & Society, 
58(1): 3–19. 
Freeman, R. E., & Newkirk, D. 2009. Business as a human enterprise. In S. Gregg & J. R. 
Stoner (Eds.), Rethinking business management: Examining the foundations of business 
education: 139–43. Princeton, NJ: ISI. 
Freyenhagen, F. 2013. Adorno’s practical philosophy: Living less wrongly. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Freyenhagen, F. 2018. Critical theory and social pathology. In E. Hammer, A. Honneth, & 
P. Gordon (Eds.), Routledge companion to the Frankfurt School: 410–23. Abingdon, UK: 
Routledge. 
Geuss, R. 2005. Suffering and knowledge in Adorno. In Outside ethics: 111–30. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Goodman, J., & Arenas, D. 2015. Engaging ethically: A discourse ethics perspective on 
social shareholder engagement. Business Ethics Quarterly, 25(2): 163–89. 
Gorz, A. 1985. Paths to paradise: On the liberation from work. London: Pluto Press. 
Habermas, J. 1987. Theory of communicative action: Vol. 2. Lifeworld and system: A 
critique of functionalist reason. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Harcourt, E. 2018. Containment and “rational health”: Moran and psychoanalysis. 
European Journal of Philosophy, 26(2): 798–813. 
Heath, J. 2014. Morality, competition, and the firm. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hegel, G. W. F. 1991. Elements of the philosophy of right. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hempel, C., & Oppenheim, P. 1948. Studies in the logic of explanation. Philosophy of 
Science, 12: 135–75. 
23 
 
Hughes, E. C. 1951. Work and the self. In J. Rohrer & M. Sherif (Eds.), Social psychology 
at the crossroads: 313–23. New York: Harper. 
Hulatt, O. 2016. Adorno’s theory of philosophical and aesthetic truth. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Islam, G. 2012. Recognition, reification, and practices of forgetting: Ethical implications 
of human resource management. Journal of Business Ethics, 111(1): 37–48. 
Jager, L. 2003. Adorno: A political biography. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Jeffries, S. 2016. Grand hotel abyss: The lives of the Frankfurt School. New York: Verso 
Books. 
Jeske, D., & Shultz, K. S. 2016. Using social media content for screening in recruitment 
and selection: pros and cons. Work, Employment, and Society, 30(3): 535–46. 
Jutten, T. 2010. Adorno on Kant, freedom and determinism. European Journal of 
Philosophy, 20(4): 548–74. 
Keat, R. 1981. The politics of social theory: Habermas, Freud and the critique of 
positivism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Klikauer, T. 2015. Critical management studies and critical theory: A review. Capital and 
Class, 39(2): 197–220. 
Léné, A. 2019. Job satisfaction and bad jobs: Why are cleaners so happy at work? Work, 
Employment, and Society, 33(4): 666–81. 
Lippke, R. L. 1999. The “Necessary Evil” Defense of Manipulative Advertising. Business 
& Professional Ethics Journal, 18(1): 3-20. 
MacIntyre, A. 2007. After virtue (3rd ed.). London: Duckworth. 
Marcoux, A. 2009. Business-focused business ethics. In J. Smith (Ed.), Normative theory 
and business ethics: 17–34. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Marx, K. 1978. Economic and philosophic manuscripts of 1844, in R. C. Tucker (Ed.), The 
Marx–Engels reader (2nd ed.): 66–125. New York: W. W. Norton. 
Melé, D. 2001. Loyalty in business: Subversive doctrine or real need? Business Ethics 
Quarterly, 11(1): 11–26. 
Moore, G. 2008. Re-imagining the morality of management: A modern virtue ethics 
approach. Business Ethics Quarterly, 18(4): 483–511. 
Muller-Doohm, S. 2003. Adorno. Cambridge: Polity. 
Munro, I., & Thanem, T. 2018. The ethics of affective leadership: Organizing good 
encounters without leaders. Business Ethics Quarterly, 28(1): 51–69. 
24 
 
Musílek, K., Jamie, K., & McKie, L. 2020. Cold winds and warm attachments: 
Interrogating the personal attachment to neoliberal work and economy. Work, Employment, 
and Society, 34(3): 514–25. 
Neurath, O. 1973. Empirical sociology. In R. Cohen & M. Neurath (Eds.), Empiricism and 
sociology: 319–421. Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel. 
Nevasto, J. 2019. The concept of need in the thought of Theodor Adorno. Unpublished 
doctoral thesis, University of Essex. 
Nussbaum, M. 2001. Adaptive preferences and women’s options. Economics and 
Philosophy, 17(1): 67–88. 
O’Connor, B. 2004. Adorno’s negative dialectic: Philosophy and the possibility of critical 
rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Outhwaite, W. 1987. New philosophies of social science. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan. 
Parker, M. 2003. Business, ethics and business ethics: Critical theory and negative 
dialectics. In M. Alvesson & H. Willmott (Eds.), Studying management critically: 197–
219. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Popper, K. 2002. The logic of scientific discovery. London: Routledge. 
Raz, J. 1986. The morality of freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Reeves, C. 2009a. Causality and critical theory. Journal of Critical Realism, 8(3): 316–42. 
Reeves, C. 2009b. “Exploding the limits of the law”: Judgement and freedom in Arendt 
and Adorno. Res Publica, 15(2): 137–64. 
Reeves, C. 2016a. Adorno, freedom and criminal law. Law and Critique, 27(3): 323–48. 
Reeves, C. 2016b. Beyond the postmetaphysical turn: Ethics and metaphysics in critical 
theory. Journal of Critical Realism, 15(3): 217–44. 
Root, T., & McKay, S. 2014. Student awareness of the use of social media screening by 
prospective employers. Journal of Education for Business, 89: 202–6. 
Rubery, J., Grimshaw, D., Keizer, A., & Johnson, M. 2018. Challenges and contradictions 
in the “normalising” of precarious work. Work, Employment, and Society, 32(3): 509–27. 
Satz, D. 2010. Why some things should not be for sale: The moral limits of markets. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Sayer, A. 1992. Method in social science. London: Routledge. 
Scherer, A. G. 2015. Can hypernorms be justified? Insights from a discourse–ethical 
perspective. Business Ethics Quarterly, 25(4): 489–516. 
25 
 
Scherer, A. G., & Palazzo, G. 2007. Toward a political conception of corporate 
responsibility: Business and society seen from a Habermasian perspective. Academy of 
Management Review, 32(4): 1096–1120. 
Shaw, W. H. 2009. Marxism, business ethics, and corporate social responsibility. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 84(4): 565–76. 
Sinnicks, M. 2018. Leadership after virtue: Macintyre’s critique of management 
reconsidered. Journal of Business Ethics, 147(4): 735–46. 
Sinnicks, M. 2020. “We ought to eat in order to work, not vice versa”: MacIntyre, practices, 
and the best work for humankind. Journal of Business Ethics. DOI:10.1007/s10551-020-
04603-4. 
Sison, A. J. G., Ferrero, I., & Guitián, G. 2016. Human dignity and the dignity of work: 
Insights from Catholic social teaching. Business Ethics Quarterly, 26(4): 503–28. 
Slovensky, R., & Ross, W. H. 2012. Should human resource managers use social media to 
screen job applicants? Managerial and legal issues in the USA. info, 14(1): 55–69. 
Sternberg, E. 2000. Just business: Business ethics in action (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Sykes, G., & Matza, D. 1957. Techniques of neutralization: A theory of delinquency. 
American Sociological Review, 22: 664–70. 
Tsoukas, H. 2019. Philosophical organization theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Van Iddekinge, C. H., Lanivich, S. E., Roth, P. L., & Junco, E. 2016. Social media for 
selection? Validity and adverse impact potential of a Facebook-based assessment. Journal 
of Management, 42(7): 1811–35. 
Varelius, J. 2009. Is whistle-blowing compatible with employee loyalty? Journal of 
Business Ethics, 85(2): 263–75. 
Visser, M. 2019. Pragmatism, critical theory and business ethics: Converging lines. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 156(1): 45–57. 
von Kriegstein, H. 2016. Professionalism, agency, and market failures. Business Ethics 
Quarterly, 26(4): 445–64. 
Wicks, A. C., Werhane, P. H., Elms, H., & Nolan, J. 2020. Spheres of influence: A 
Walzerian approach to business ethics. Journal of Business Ethics. DOI:10.1007/s10551-
020-04616-z. 
Wiggerhaus, R. 1994. The Frankfurt School: Its history, theories and political significance. 
Cambridge: Polity. 
Yeoman, R. 2014. Conceptualising meaningful work as a fundamental human need. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 125(2): 235–51. 
26 
 
Zuidervaart, L. 1991. Adorno’s aesthetic theory: The redemption of illusion. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
Zuidervaart, L. 2007. Social philosophy after Adorno. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
